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Strategic Asset Transfer in IT Outsourcing Contracts 
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Qiang Zeng  




Outsourcing contract with IT asset transfer limits the options of the client firm in vendor selection in future, and it is 
puzzling as why client self creates “switching costs” which limit her own contractual options. This paper attempts to 
unravel this puzzle through a game theoretic set up wherein the client faces vendors endowed with heterogeneous 
capabilities whose effort is unobservable and though IT services quality is observable; it is not verifiable and thus 
not contractible. Counter to intuition, we show that client uses asset transfer as a costly device to screen out vendors 
of low capability and voluntarily lock herself in a long-term relationship by enhancing the bargaining of the vendor 
ex-post. We extend the model to a multi-tasking vendor who also exerts asset-upgrading effort and show that 
screening power of IT asset transfer in enhanced when asset-improving effort has spill over effect on delivered IT 
services.  
Key words 
 IT services, outsourcing, asset transfer, monopolistic screening, non-contractible quality  
INTRODUCTION 
 
“One of the most important factors determining pricing, incentive alignment, and other dynamics of an outsourcing 
engagement is the ownership of IT assets”. 
                                                         “Show Me the Assets!” Everest Research Institute 2007 
It is commonly thought that asset ownership plays an important role in encouraging asset-specific human capital 
investments by reducing the threat of hold-up and by providing strong incentives to the vendor to make large asset-
specific investments when those investments are critical for efficient provisioning of IT services in outsourcing 
relationships (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995).  On the other hand, transferring IT assets 
(IT systems and human capital) to the vendor creates a substantial switching cost for the client (Barthélemy and 
Quélin 2006) and thus raises the risk of the client getting locked-in a sub-optimal outsourcing relationship and 
subject to even severe holdup risks. Furthermore, owning the IT assets may incentivize the vendor to exert more 
effort on improving the value of the assets and vendor may systematically substitute effort away from improving 
quality of services. Further, often clients face heterogeneous vendors with private information about their own 
intrinsic abilities and quality-improving effort is not observable. Some of these agency issues in IT services 
outsourcing are further compounded by the fact that though the quality of IT services is observable, it’s not 
verifiable and thus not contractible. So why do client firms limit their future partnership options and put themselves 
in a vulnerable position by making IT asset transfer as a part of the outsourcing contract? The answer may lie in the 
ongoing nature of long-term IT outsourcing relationships, which may provide the client the opportunity to reduce the 
inefficiency caused by unverifiable quality in screening out low capability vendors under information asymmetry 
(Holmstrom 1985, Williamson 1983, Halonen 2002).  
Asset transfer and investment incentives in IT outsourcing 
Firms may outsource their IT services in two fundamentally different ways: transferring the ownership of the IT 
assets to the vendor, commonly referred to as “asset-heavy” approach, or retaining the ownership of the IT assets, 
referred to as “asset-light” approach. While the asset-heavy approach was sort of industry norm in 90s, asset-light 
approach has gained popularity in recent years (Ritwik and Tisnovsky. 2007). While transferring the IT assets to the 
vendor has immediate cash beneifts, it may create substantial switching costs since it takes a large amount of 
resources (both financial and human capital) to recreate a working IT environment including IT infrastructure and 
skilled human capital to provide comparable IT services when the incumbent outsourcing vendor is to be replaced.  
It’s not clear as why the client firms self create switching cost and thus get locked-in long-term relationships given 
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that switching costs seems to discourage the vendors exert efficient effort to improve service quality (Williamson 
1983). Further, its not clear as what specific elements of the client-vendor relationship drive asset transfer and under 
what conditions no asset transfer may be optimal?.  
In this research, we study the effects of asset ownership and other contractual mechanisms such as probationary 
period (or trial period) and contract extendibility terms on providing incentives to the vendor in the context of IT 
services outsourcing. In our conceptualization, while the vendors are heterogeneous in their intrinsic capability, they 
may exert two kinds of efforts: asset-upgrading effort (improving the value of the assets) and quality-improving 
effort which are not contractible as services quality is non-verifiable though observable. We show that client uses 
asset transfer as a costly device to screen out vendors of low capability and voluntarily locks herself in a long-term 
relationship. Additionally, we find that the positive spillover of the vendor’s asset-upgrading effort enhances the 
screening power of asset transfer.  
 
Literature review 
Inefficiency caused by unverifiable quality under information asymmetry has been intensively studied by 
economists. Farrell and Shapiro (1989) study optimal contacts when quality is not verifiable and the buyer incurs 
some switching costs, and show that, when switching costs are unobservable, long-term contracts can mitigate 
opportunism but some inefficiency still remains. Bac (2000) developed a model in which the switching costs created 
by the buyer play a role in screening vendors and thus decrease inefficiency caused by unverifiable quality under 
asymmetric information. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that firms may also strategically leave some 
verifiable aspects of performance unspecified when some other aspects of performance are unverifiable, 
intentionally creating incompleteness in a well-designed contract.  
The property rights literature (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 1995, Hart and Moore 1990) has emphasized that asset 
ownership is determined by the marginal product of quasi-rents with respect to non-contractible investments. Hart 
(1995)’s showed that if the buyer’s human capital is essential, then the buyer owning all the assets is optimal; if the 
seller’s human capital is essential, then vendor owning all the assets is optimal. In a recent work, Hart (2009) 
showed that one party should own all the assets if payoff is uncertain, and asset ownership matters because it 
determines which assets each party can walk away with if trade does not occur. Our research combines the notion 
that owning the assets necessary for service delivery increases the party’s ability to engage in holdup (Hart, 2009) 
with the property rights notion that assets ownership provides high-powered incentives for relationship-specific 
investments.  
While very little theoretical work has been done to investigate the incentive issues in the IT outsourcing literature, a 
few studies empirically examine how contractual provisions are determined. Using the multi-task principal-agent 
framework, Fitoussi and Gurbaxani (2011) study how contractual mechanisms are used to provide incentives to the 
vendors when client firms share the object of reducing IT costs and differ in the importance of increasing IT quality. 
Gurbaxani (2007) focuses on how specific clauses are used to mitigate the risks of opportunism faced by both 
parties.  
IT outsourcing relationships have some unique features which worth serious theoretical investigation: transferring 
the IT assets necessary for service delivery to the vendor creates a substantial switching cost (Barthélemy and 
Quélin 2006); quality is not verifiable and thus not ex-ante contractible (Holmstrom 1985); the vendors are 
heterogeneous in intrinsic capability; quality-improving effort are unobservable and thus non-contractible; the 
contracts vary in duration and asset ownership choices; probationary or extendibility clauses can be used to provide 
incentives or mitigate risks (Susarla et al 2010); and the clients have different preferences on IT services quality 
(Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2011). Our model attempts to capture these essential characteristics of IT outsourcing 
contract and is different from Banerjee and Dulfo (2000) model in which the quality is exogenous, observable and 
verifiable, while in our model,  IT services quality is endogenous, observable but not verifiable and  vendors are 
heterogeneous in capability that affects services quality. 
This paper is organized as follows:  In §2, we set up the basic model. In §3 we examine optimal contracts under one 
dimensional quality-improving effort by the vendor.  In §4 we analyze optimal contracts with multi-tasking vendor. 
In §5, we discuss our results and identify suitable theoretical and managerial implications. 
THE MODEL 
	   3	  
We consider a client who has a pool of large number of vendors who can provide him one unit of IT services in each 
period. There are two periods: probationary period and second period. The vendors are heterogeneous in their 
intrinsic capability: { },L Hq q q= , with probability m ( )1 m-­‐ , the vendor will be of high capability type (low 
capability type). Intrinsic capability ( )H Lq q q>  is private knowledge of the vendor and client only knows the 
distribution. The quality of the outsourced IT services depends on the costly quality improving effort x  of the 
vendor, which is not observed by the client. Further, the quality of the IT services is observable by the client but is 
not verifiable, and thus is not contractible. The quality of IT services is given as ( , )q x xq q= +  and the client’s 
payoff is given as ( , )v q x pq= -­‐ , where p is the  monetary transfer from the client to vendor for receiving 
contracted IT services. The vendor’s payoff is given as ( )u p c e x= -­‐ -­‐ , where ( )e x  is the cost of quality 
improving effort and c is is cost of IT services provisioning. The contractual arrangement between the client and 
vendor can be for two periods and the total payoff for each party is additive over two periods, 1 2V v v= +  for the 
client and 1 2U u u= +  for the vendor. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is no discounting for the 
payoffs from the extended period. Furthermore, the quality-improving effort by the vendor in the probationary 
period is consistent with ex ante relationship-specific investments in the property rights literature. 
 
The contract offered by the client can have IT asset (including physical and human assets) transfer provision or not. 
In our conceptualization, IT asset transfer induces a self-imposed switching cost for the client and is denoted by 
variableA . 0A =  represents a contract with no asset transfer. Note that the switching cost A  is real resource cost 




1. Cost of IT services provisioning c is exogenously determined and is common knowledge. 
2. The vendor’s cost of quality improving effort ( )e x  is strictly convex and increasing in x , i.e., ( ) 0,e x¢ > and 
( ) 0,e x¢¢ > for 	  x" . 
3. H Lcq q> > . This ensures that if client contracts with vendor of Lq  type who puts in zero quality improving 
effort, the total payoff in each period (sum of pay off of client and vendor in each period) is negative. 
4. ( )1 0H L cmq m q+ -­‐ -­‐ ≥ . This ensures that if client contracts with a vendor of unknown capability type, who 
exerts zero quality improving effort, the expected payoff is positive. 
5. Any quality ( )q  contingent contracting mechanism is infeasible as quality is non-verifiable. 
 
We consider two types of contractual arrangements: a short-term contract { }1;sS p A= which is only for the first 
period, i.e., probationary period; and a long-term contract { }1 2; ;lS p p A= . We model the two period relationships 
as a dynamic game and the sequence and timing of the events is given in Figure 1 and is postulated to be consistent 
with a real outsourcing contracting process in which outsourcing client firms seek an appropriate vendor in the first 
period (probationary period) and then negotiate prices for the second period (extended period). At Date 1, the client 
offers a contract { }1,sS p A= , at the beginning of probationary period, to all potential vendors; the vendors make 
acceptance decisions, the client chooses one among those who accept, and the relationship begins. The vendor 
chooses quality-improving effort x . At Date 2, IT services quality is realized and upon observing it, the client 
updates her beliefs on the vendor’s intrinsic capability. The client decides to terminate the relationship or continue. 
If the contract is terminated, game ends. If client chooses to continue the relationship, client negotiates with vendor 
and the price 2p  for the extended period is determined. At Date 3, the parties’ payoffs (sums of their respective 
payoffs in the two periods) are realized.  
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Figure 1: Timing of the Events 
The client’s objective is to construct a contract mechanism so that he can successfully screens out the heterogeneous 
vendors in order to avoid being locked-in with the low intrinsic capability vendor ( )Lq  and also to induce the 
vendor to exert optimal quality improving effort. Note that the non-contractibility of quality and private information 
on intrinsic capability, creates fertile ground for a Lq  type vendor to mimic Hq  vendor by putting in sufficiently 
high effort and thus effort can be used to conceal the “true icapability” as two are substitutes.  
 
Definition 1: A contracting mechanism is efficient if it ensures (i) that the client contracts only with the high 
capability ( )Hq  vendor, and (ii) the vendor exerts the optimal effort { }* argmax ( )
x
x x e x= -­‐ . 
The efficient contracting mechanism has to keep in consideration the effect of effort as a substitute for intrinsic 
capability at both the beginning of the contracting relationship and the contract renewal stage to avoid getting 
locked-in with a “low capability” vendor. In §3  and §4 we construct efficient mechanism for the vendor under 
different conditions and study their implications for efficient mechanism for IT services outsourcing. 
 
OPTIMAL EFFICIENT CONTRACTS 
Our parsimonious model set up has three key characteristics, namely IT services quality, intrinsic capability of 
vendors and quality-improving effort by the vendor that capture the essence of the contracting issues in IT 
outsourcing.  In order to contrast our results under non-contractible quality and adverse selection, first we develop 
benchmark contracts when quality is verifiable and thus contractible. It is easy to see that client will offer a short 
term contract in the first period with *1 Hq xq= + , ( )*1p c e x= + . The vendor with high capability contracts and 
puts in optimal quality-improving effort *x  as only that level of effort can produce the contracted quality, and gets 
zero payoffs which is equal to his outside option. Any vendor with low capability will not contract as her payoff will 
be negative ( ) ( )( )* * 0H Le x e x q q-­‐ + -­‐ < .This contract is perfectly separating and allows for costless screening to 
the client as he is able to bind the desirable matching party ( Hq  type) to her outside option. Thus in the benchmark 
case, even with asymmetric information and unobservable effort, client offers the first-best contract. The economic 
intuition behind this somewhat surprising result is that “it is possible to design contracts that are contingent upon 
variables that are both relevant to the delivery of the service and are observed so that contracts can be enforced” 
(Holmstrom 1985, pp. 188). Since the quality is verifiable, contracts contingent upon quality can be enforced to 
achieve the first best efficiency. 
 
When the quality is non contractible, then the client can not screen out the low-capability types or induce effort by 
using only price as contracting variable and thus no efficient contracting mechanism is possible. If the client chooses 
a long term contact { }1 2, ,lS p p T=  with some sufficiently large termination feeT , then the vendor faces virtually 
no risk of termination. Both parties are locked in for two periods, and therefore the vendor will choose 0tx = in 
both periods. The payoff to the vendor will be 1 2 2p p c+ -­‐ , and in order to make sure that the vendor participates, 
client must satisfy the individual rationality constraint of the vendor and so the client must choose 1 2 2p p c+ = , 
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and his payoff will be ( )2 1H L cmq m qÈ ˘+ -­‐ -­‐Í ˙Î ˚ .  Interestingly, the vendor’s utility 1 2 0U u u= + =  is independent 
of the type and this contacting mechanism has no screening power. This is due to the fact that large termination fee 
T  imposes large cost of breach of contract and there is no link between the vendor’s second period payoff 2u and 
client’s belief about the vendor’s type based upon the observed quality of the IT services after the first period. Thus 
any efficient contracting mechanism requires that the vendor should have ability to terminate the contract if he 
believes that he is matched with a Lq  type vendor, and also should provide incentives to the vendor to exert effort. 
Its easy to see that any contract that specifies second period price 2p ex-ante can never do that. Further, in order to 
provide the incentives to the vendor to exert effort in the period 1, we need to have an instrument to credibly signal 
commitment of the client that he will not appropriate the gains of the quality-improving effort of the vendor and thus 
must self impose a one sided cost if the contract is not extended into second period. As described earlier, asset 
transfer A , imposes a cost on client if the contract is terminated after the period 1. Thus, now onwards we consider 
the take-it-or-leave-it offers of { }1,sS p A= . Next, we develop contracts with no asset transfer, 0A = , and then 
we analyze the role of asset transfer on the efficiency of the contracting mechanism.  
 
Optimal contracts with no asset transfer 
We study the dynamic game by solving the price for the second period first. Given that the quality is not contractible 
and relationship ends by the end of the extended period, the vendor would clearly exert no quality-improving effort 
in the second period. The vendor’s second period payoff is given by * *2 2( ) ( )v p cp p= -­‐ , where p  is the client’s 
updated belief on the vendor being high capability. Note that the vendor updates her belief upon observing the 
quality by the end of the probationary period:  1( ) 1H qp q q= =  if 
*
1 Hq xq≥ + ,  1( ) 0H qp q q= = if 1 Hq q< , 
and p  is increasing in 1q  if 
*
1H Hq xq q£ < + . We assume that the client’s optimal price,
*
2( )p p , is increasing in 
p to capture the idea that the client’s confidence on the vendor’s capability increases the incumbent vendor’s 
bargaining power at the interim and thus the price for the second period. Now we proceed to the first period and 
focus on the set of efficient screening Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) defined below. 
Definition 2: Given the price for the extended period, an Efficient Screening PBE, denoted { }* * * *1, , ,H Lp x x p , is the 
price for the probationary period, *1p , the vendor’s effort choices { }* *,H Lx x , and the client’s beliefs on the vendor 
being high capability, *p , for which, 
1. The effort choices are the best responses given the price offered 
2. The price is sequentially rational given the belief updating 
3. The belief updating satisfies Bayes’ Rule when it applies. 
4. Only Hq  type vendors accept the contract and the selected vendor exerts the efficient quality-improving effort 
{ }* arg ax ( )
x
x m x e x= -­‐   
5. The client continues with the Hq  type vendor in the extended period. 
PROPOSITION 1: Given the expected price *2( )p p to be negotiated for the extended period,  
(1) The efficient screening PBE exists if * *2(1) ( )p c e x-­‐ >  in which, 
* * *
1 22 ( ) (1)p c e x p= + -­‐  and the client’s 
payoff is given by * * *2 2 ( )HV x c e xq= + -­‐ -­‐ ,  
(2) The efficient screening PBE does not exist if * *2(1) ( )p c e x-­‐ £ . ( See proof in the Appendix). 
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*
2 2 (1)
HU p c= −
* *
1 1 ( )
H








LU p c= −
*( )e x c+





No	  efficient	  screening	  PBE
 
Figure 2: Efficient screening PBE 
Figure 2 above explains the efficient screening PBE. The dashed downward-sloping line, *1
L
LU p c= -­‐ , is the total 
payoff of the Lq type vendor who exerts zero effort in the probationary period and thus does not extend thee contract 
in the second period. The dashed horizontal line, * *( ) ( )ML H LU e x e x q q= -­‐ + -­‐ , is the mimicking Lq type 
vendor’s total payoff. The solid downward-sloping line, * *1 1 ( )
H
HU p c e x= -­‐ -­‐ is the Hq type vendor’s payoff for the 
probationary period. *2 2(1)
HU p c= -­‐ is the vendor’s (the Hq type or the Lq type who mimics as Hq type) extended 
period payoff. While the Hq type vendor’s total payoff is zero, the mimicking Lq type vendor’s payoff is negative 
since he has to exert higher level of effort to successfully convince the client he is a Hq type. Note that the un-
mimicking Lq type vendor’s payoff would be positive when 
* *
2(1) ( )p c e x-­‐ <  and thus he would accept the contract 
and there would be no successful screening. 
 
Note that, when * *2(1) ( )p c e x-­‐ < , the client could offer a contract 
*
1p c=  to prevent the Lq type vendor from 
getting the “free lunch”. However, setting the first period price as c  without increasing the vendor’s bargaining 
power effectively forces the  Hq type vendor to get a negative total payoff if he exert his quality-improving effort at 
the efficient level (as shown by the solid downward sloping line * *2(1) ( )
H
HU p c e x= -­‐ -­‐  in Figure 3 below). Thus a 
Hq  type vendor who plans to exert his quality-improving effort at the efficient level would not accept the contract. 
Therefore an efficient screening PBE cannot be obtained by price alone. 
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* *
2 (1) ( )
H
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Figure 3: No efficient Screening PBE when * *2(1) ( )p c e x-­‐ £  
Intuitively, given the expected price to be paid for the extended period, the client can construct the optimal price for 
the probationary period that just compensates the vendor’s total costs for the two periods and deprive the vendor of 
the future gains in advance as well. In other words, the client compensates the high-type vendor for the cost of his 
quality-improving effort he exerts in the probationary period with the price she pays for the extended period so that 
the Hq type vendor exerts his effort in the probationary period at the efficient level and waits until the extended 
period to get the compensation. However, it is too costly for the Lq type vendor to deliver a quality that is at least the 
same as what is delivered by the Hq type in order to mimic. This successfully screening can be achieved only when 
the vendor’s compensation (namely, his net revenue from providing services) in the extended period is larger than 
the cost of the quality-improving effort he exerts in the probationary period. When the when the vendor’s net 
revenue from providing services in the extended period cannot compensate the cost of the quality-improving effort 
he exerts in the probationary period, exerting efficient quality-improving effort is too costly (
*
1 2( *) (1) 0p c e x p c-­‐ -­‐ + -­‐ < ) for any vendor which may allow the Lq type to get a free lunch by accepting the 
probationary contract and exerting zero quality-improving effort ( 1 0p c-­‐ ≥ ). Thus a cost device is needed for the 
client to successfully screen out low capability vendors under this condition. The idea is that the client has to be 
convincingly promise the Hq type vendor that he will be sufficiently compensated for the quality-improving effort 
he exerts in the probationary period. In order for her promise to be convincingly, the client has to increase the 
vendor’s bargaining power in the extended period by self creating a substantial switching costs (namely, transferring 
the IT assets to the vendor).   
 
Optimal contracts with asset transfer 
With asset transfer, the vendor’s second period payoff is now given by * *2 2( , ) ( , )U A p A cp p= -­‐ . We assume that the 
client’s optimal price, *2( , )p Ap , is increasing in both p and A  to capture the idea that the client’s confidence on the 
vendor’s capability and positive asset transfer that creates switching cost for her,  increases the incumbent vendor’s 
bargaining power and thus the price for the second period. Now we proceed to the first period and focus on the set of 
efficient screening Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) defined in Definition 2. 
PROPOSITION 2: Given the expected price *2( , )p Ap to be negotiated for the second period,  
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(1) The efficient screening PBE exists if * *2(1, ) ( )p A c e x-­‐ >  in which, 
* * *
1 2( ) 2 ( ) (1, )p A c e x p A= + -­‐ for any 
0,A AÈ ˘ŒÍ ˙Î ˚ , where (1 )H LA cpq p q= + -­‐ -­‐  
(2) The efficient screening PBE exists if * *2(1, ) ( )p A c e x-­‐ £  in which, 
*
1( )p A c=  only for 
*A A=  that satisfies 
* * *
2(1, ) ( )p A c e x-­‐ =  
(3). In the efficient screening PBE, the client’s payoff is given by *2 2 ( )H HV x c e xq= + -­‐ -­‐  
Note that, if the switching cost is larger than A , than client would prefer not to outsource IT services in the 
extended period, rather than outsource services to a vendor of unknown capability. The efficient screening PBE with 
asset transfer is shown in figure 4 below. 
*
2 2 (1)
HU p c= −
* *
1 1 ( ) ( )
H
HU p A c e x= − −
*






LU p A c= −
*( )e x c+







Figure 4: Efficient Screening PBE with asset transfer 
As we have shown in Figure 3, when the vendor’s bargaining power is low, setting the first period price as c  would 
not only just prevent the Lq  vendor from accepting the contract but also force the Hq  vendor who exerts efficient 
level effort to get a negative total payoff. Note that, carefully-chosen *A effectively keeps the Hq vendor’s payoff 
for the extended period at *( )e x , his payoff for the probationary period at *( )e x-­‐ , and his total payoff the same 
(zero). And the non-mimicking Lq type vendor’s payoff is kept at zero as well and so that he would not strictly 
prefer to accept the contract. Comparing the client’s payoffs under asset transfer and no asset transfer, we have the 
following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Asset transfer broadens the set of the efficient screening PBE, though  the client’s payoff given 
by *2 2 ( )H HV x c e xq= + -­‐ -­‐  remains the same under both asset transfer contract and no asset transfer contract. 
 
The qualitative interpretations of this result are as follows. Introducing a positive switching cost increases the 
vendor’s bargaining power on negotiating the second period price. The vendor’s increased second period payoff 
compensates him for the cost of exerting efficient level of effort in the probationary period, which allows the client 
to efficiently screening out vendors of low capability. Since the vendor’s cost of effort in the first period is being 
offset by the increased payoff in the second period, he is indifferent. Since the screening efficiency is increased by 
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introducing a positive and carefully chosen switching cost, the client would be less likely to be locked in a 
relationship with a vendor of low capability. 
The key insight is that the client has to convince the Hq type vendor that he will be sufficiently compensated for the 
quality-improving effort he exerts in the probationary period. When the vendor’s natural bargaining power is not 
convincing enough, the client has to increase the vendor’s bargaining power in the interim stage by self creating a 
substantial switching costs (namely, transferring the IT assets to the vendor).  So the vendor’s cost of effort in the 
probationary period can be compensated by the increased net revenue for the extended period and the probationary 
period price just covers that service cost so that the Lq type vendor just stay with his outside options.  
 
DISCUSSION 
When vendors are heterogeneous in intrinsic capabilities that impact the quality of delivered IT services, transferring 
the IT assets to create switching costs for the client affects her in an asymmetrically way: it only affects her (the 
client) if she is not able to extend the contract in the second period. The positive switching cost that client bears in 
case the contract is terminated after the probationary period, increases the vendor’s bargaining power in negotiations 
on price ex-post, at the beginning of the extended period, which compensates him for the cost of exerting efficient 
level of effort in the probationary period. The low capability vendors would find it either worthless to accept the 
contract (if he does not exert any effort) or too costly to mimic as a high capability vendor. A pricing mechanism, on 
the other hand, affects the vendors’ payoffs symmetrically: it affects all the vendors in the same way, which either 
allows a positive payoff for the low capability vendor if the client wants the high capability vendor to accept the 
contract, or client fails to attract the high capability vendor if she attempts to prevent the low capability vendor from 
accepting the contract.  Therefore transferring the IT assets to the vendor allows the client to efficiently screening 
out vendors of low capability when a pricing mechanism alone has no screening power. Since asset transfer allows 
efficient screening, the client is less likely to be locked in a relationship with a low capability vendor. 
 
This seemingly surprising result is consistent with the observations in IT infrastructure outsourcing contracts. The 
outsourcing firms often sign the so-called “transformational” IT infrastructure outsourcing contracts, which are 
characterized by long duration with asset transfer, with the reputed vendors or market leaders in the industry while 
they often sign the so-called “pure labor arbitrage” contracts, which are characterized by short duration with no asset 
transfer, with emerging players in the industry. Since the leading vendors are willing to take the risk of making 
efficient upfront investment on transferred assets that allows them to make substantial profits beyond the initial 
periods of the contracts. On the other hand, emerging vendors with unproven records are unable to bear the high risk 
of premature termination of the relationships, and are thus not willing to accept such contracts. Thus asset transfer 
serves as an effective screening device for the outsourcing client firms to mitigate the risks of being locked-in with 
low capability vendors.  
 
The key managerial insight of our research is that, self created switching cost with asset transfer allows the client to 
credibly signal her long-term commitment to the high capability vendor so that she is able to use penalizing pricing 
mechanisms in the probationary period to deter low capability vendors. Taking the advantage of seemingly-negative 
contractual mechanisms strategically and using complementary mechanisms together may create surprising benefits 
to the firms in matching with high capability vendors.  
 
There are many possible extensions of this research. The costs of quality-improving effort may be correlated with 
capabilities among outsourcing vendors. Allowing vendors to be heterogeneous on efficiency and correlated cost of 
quality-improving effort may provide more realistic results on the client-vendor matching.   
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